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D/1998/2376/27 1 Introduction 
In June 1997 European Union (EU) government leaders agreed to yet another 
round of EU treaty changes and approved the Treaty of Amsterdam. Even 
though the Treaty is considered by some as only a minor step toward further 
European  integration,  it  contains  once  again  a  number  of  important 
institutional changes. In particular, it alters the codecision procedure, which 
was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992).1 
The codecision procedure intended to give the Parliament a more important 
role in the EU legislative process.2 It provided for negotiations between the 
Parliament and the Council in case  they approved different versions of a 
proposal. Crombez (1997a) concluded that the Parliament became a legislator 
equal in stature to the Council under codecision. The Parliament (European 
Parliament 1992) claimed, however, that the procedure failed to provide for 
real codecision "since the Council  [was]  allowed to act unilaterally in the 
absence of an agreement" with the Parliament. 
The  Parliament's conclusions  were echoed  in the literature.  Curtin (1993) 
found  that  "the  effective  balance  of  power  [was]  indisputably  weighed 
towards the Council." Tsebelis (1997) concluded that the codecision procedure 
stripped the Parliament of the conditional agenda setting powers it enjoyed 
under the cooperation procedure. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam alters the codecision procedure to meet this type of 
criticism.  In this paper I show that, rather than increasing the Parliament's 
power, the new procedure renders the Commission irrelevant, threatens to 
increase indecision (the EU's inability to act), and may actually reduce the 
Parliament's power (its  ability  to  obtain a  policy  that is  close  to  its  ideal 
policy). 
2 The EU legislative process has received widespread attention in recent years. 
The  literature  includes  theoretical  analyses  of  the  legislative  procedures, 
amongst others by Steunenberg (1994),  Tsebelis (1994),  and Crombez (1996, 
1997a).  These  models  formulate  conclusions  in  terms  of  equilibrium  EU 
policies,  and  the  equilibrium  policies  depend  on the  preferences  of  the 
Commission, the Parliament and the countries. 
Crombez (1997b) endogenizes the Commission's preferences by studying the 
Commission  appointment  process.  He  characterizes  sets  of  effective 
Commissions, i.e., Commissions that can be appointed and can successfully 
propose their own ideal  policies,  as functions  of  the ideal  policies  of the 
countries and the Parliament. Crombez (1998)  provides a theoretical analysis 
of logrolling in the EU legislative process. 
This paper presents spatial models of codecision in the EU.  Alternative EU 
policies are represented by points in a policy space and policy makers are 
assumed to have preferences over these points. The countries, Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) and Commissioners have complete and perfect 
information.  The  models  yield  equilibrium  policies  as  functions  of  the 
countries', MEPs'  and Commissioners' preferences, and the location of the 
status quo. I present unidimensional and multidimensional models of the old 
and new codecision procedures, i.e., the procedure that is used today and the 
procedure that will be used after the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam.3 
The unidimensional modeS are simplified versions of the multidimensional 
models. In the unidimensional models the Parliament and the Commission 
are represented as unitary actors. 
In the next section I introduce the models. The third section studies the old 
codecision procedure. It characterizes equilibrium EU  policies  and sets  of 
successful proposals under the old codecision procedure, i.e., sets of policies 
the Commission can successfully propose. In the fourth section I analyze the 
3 new codecision procedure. I characterize equilibrium EU policies and sets of 
successful  joint  texts,  i.e.,  sets  of  policies  the  Council  and  Parliament 
Presidents can successfully propose. The fifth section presents the conclusions. 
The  conclusions  of  the  multidmensional  models  can  be  summarized  as 
follows.  I  find  that under  the  old codecision  procedure  the  Commission 
President successfully proposes the policy he prefers most among the policies 
that satisfy  the following  three conditions:  (1)  a  qualified  majority in the 
Council and a majority of the MEPs prefer it  to the status quo, (2) no policy is 
preferred to it by the Parliament and Council Presidents, a qualified majority 
in  the  Council  and  a  majority  of  MEPs,  and  (3)  a  majority  of  the 
Commissioners prefer it to  the policy that would be implemented if they 
rejected  it.  Furthermore,  I  show  that  the  Parliament  becomes  a  genuine 
colegislator  with  the  Council,  and  that  the  Commission  has  substantial 
agenda setting powers under the old codecision procedure.4 
By contrast, I conclude that the Commission's role is irrelevant under the new 
codecision  procedure.  Under  that  procedure  the  Parliament  and  Council 
Presidents choose the EU policy from among the policies that satisfy the first 
two conditions mentioned above.  I  also  conclude  that the changes  to  the 
codecision procedure may weaken the Parliament's power. Furthermore, I 
show that the new codecision procedure threatens to increase indecision in 
the EU. 
2 The Models 
I present spatial models of EU policy making under the codecision procedure. 
Alternative  policies  are represented by points in an n-dimensional  policy 
space.  Each dimension corresponds to  a  specific  policy  issue,  such as the 
allowable noncocoa fat level in chocolate or the length of daylight saving 
time. Policy making can then be thought of as choosing a point in the policy 
4 space. I assume that countries have Euclidean preferences over the ED policy 
p(pl,  ... ,pn), with ideal policy  Pk(Pkl,.··,P/')  for country k.  Each country 
has an ideal policy and prefers policies that are closer to, rather than farther 
away from, its ideal policy. The MEPs and Commissioners are also assumed 
to have Euclidean preferences over ED policies. 
I  study  the  old  codecision  procedure,  as  introduced  by  the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht and in use today, and the new codecision procedure, as altered by 
the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam.  I  present  unidimensional  as  well  as 
multidimensional models of both procedures. The multidimensional models 
of the procedures are shown in Figure 1.  First,  the Commission President 
proposes a policy.5 Subsequently, the Commissioners vote on the proposal. If 
the proposal obtains the support of a simple majority of the Commissioners, it 
is  sent to the Parliament and the Council. If the proposal fails to obtain the 
support of a majority of the Commissioners, a status quo proposal is sent to 
the Parliament and the Council. 
---Figure 1 about here---
The  MEPs  and the countries,  as  represented in the Council,  can together 
approve  an  amendment,  referred  to  as  a  joint  text.6  In  particular,  the 
Parliament President can propose a joint text in the third stage. If the Council 
President approves the joint text in the fourth stage, it is subsequently voted 
on in the Council and the Parliament in the fifth and sixth stages. The joint 
text needs the support of a qualified majority in the Council and a majority of 
MEPs for adoption? A qualified majority in the Council consists of 62 out of a 
total of 87 votes.8 The new codecision procedure ends with the countries' and 
MEPs' votes on the joint text. The status quo then prevails, if no joint text is 
adopted. The old codecision procedure consists of two more stages, however. 
In  particular,  the  countries  and  MEPs  vote  on  the  original  Commission 
proposal in the seventh and eighth stages of the old codecision procedure, if 
5 no joint text was adopted. The countries and MEPs compare the proposal to 
the star-LiS  quo. To be adopted the proposal needs the support of a qualified 
majority in the Council and a majority of the MEPs. If  no proposal is adopted, 
the status quo prevails. 
The unidimensional models of the old and new codecision procedures are 
simplified versions of their multidimensional counterparts. The Commission 
and  the  Parliament  use  majority  rule,  and  there  are  no  restrictions  on 
amendments. As a consequence, the analysis of policy making on dimension i 
can  be  simplified  by  focusing  on  the  ideal  policies  of  the  median 
Commissioner and the median MEP. Suppose the status quo qi  on dimension 
i  is  to  the right (left)  of the median Commissioner1s  ideal policy  Pc;'  The 
median Commissioner and all Commissioners on his left (right) then want a 
move to the left (right). As a result, any policy is defeated in the Commission 
by policies that are closer to the median Commissioner1s ideal policy. Similar 
reasoning applies to voting in the Parliament. With respect to policy making 
on dimension i  the Commission and the Parliament can thus be treated as 
unitary actors with ideal policies equal to their median voters  I  ideal policies, 
Pc i  and p/ respectively.9 
The Council is  not represented as a  unitary actor because it uses qualified 
majority rule. Nonetheless, the analysis of policy making on dimension i can 
be simplified by focusing on the countries that are pivotal under the qualified 
majority  rule.  The  country  ai  that is  pivotal for  a  move to  the  right on 
dimension i thus has an ideal policy to the left of the country with the median 
vote. In particular, country ai  is the country with the 26th vote (from the left). 
Country ai  and the countries to its right then have 62 votes, and the countries 
to its right do not constitute a  qualified majority without country  ai •  The 
country bi  that is pivotal for a move to the left is the country with the 62nd 
vote. 
6 In other respects the unidimensional models, shown in Figure 2, are similar to 
their multidimensional counterparts. First, the Commission proposes a policy. 
The  Parliament can then offer  a  joint text,  which becomes EU  policy  if  a 
qualified majority in the Council approves it. The new codecision procedure 
ends with this vote.  The status quo then prevails if the joint text does not 
obtain the  support of a  qualified  majority  in the Council.  Under the old 
codecision procedure the countries vote on the Commission proposal in the 
fourth stage, if no joint text is approved. If a qualified majority accepts the 
proposal and the Parliament approves it in the fifth stage, the proposal then 
becomes EU policy. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. 
----- Figure 2 about here-----
The models incorporate complete and perfect information. The actors, i.e., the 
institutions,  countries,  MEPs  and  Commissioners  know  each  other's 
preferences, the location of the status quo, the impact of proposed policies, the 
sequential structure of the models, and the actions taken in prior stages of the 
models. 
An equilibrium consists of a strategy for each actor. Strategies tell the actors 
what actions  to choose in the relevant stages of the procedure, given the 
actions  taken in prior stages.  The equilibrium concept is  subgame perfect 
Nash. In a Nash equilibrium, no actor can achieve a higher utility by choosing 
another strategy, given the other actors' strategies. In a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium, actors can do no better than stick to their strategies in any stage 
of the procedure, even if an actor deviated from the equilibrium strategy in a 
prior stage. 
3 The Old Codecision Procedure 
7 In this section I present the unidimensional and multidimensional models of 
the old codecision procedure. For each model I go trrrough the different steps 
of the procedure. I determine sets of successful proposals and equilibrium 
policies, for any configuration of ideal policies and for  any location of the 
status quo. I also discuss the institutions' powers and the extent of indecision. 
3.1 The Unidimensional Model of Old Codecision 
Under the old codecision procedure the Commission starts policy making on 
dimension i  by proposing a  policy  pi, as shown in Figure 2.  It wants the 
policy to be as close to its ideal policy as  possible.10 This does not imply, 
however, that the Commission proposes its  ideal policy.  The Commission 
understands the role the Council and the Parliament play in the next stages of 
the procedure and takes these into account when it makes its proposal. 
In the fourth and fifth stages the countries and the Parliament vote on the 
Commission  proposaL  The  proposal  is  adopted  if  the  Parliament  and  a 
qualified majority in the Council approve it. They approve the Commission 
proposal if  they prefer it to  the status quo.  The set  P(  q i)  of policies the 
Parliament approves in the fifth stage, is thus the set of policies the Parliament 
prefers  to  the status  quo.  Similarly,  the  set  Q(qi)  of  policies  a  qualified 
majority in the Council approves in the fourth stage, is the set of policies a 
qualified majority prefers to the status quo. 
To  illustrate policy making on dimension i  I use the configuration of ideal 
policies shown in Figure 3. Country ai, the Parliament and the Commission, 
with ideal policies  Pai, ppi  and p/  respectively, have ideal policies to the 
right of the status quo. For simplicity, the status quo qi  is assumed to be equal 
to zero. The Parliament has an ideal policy to the left of countries  ai  and bi 
that are pivotal under the qualified majority rule, whereas the Commission is 
8 located more to the right. In Figure 3 the Parliament, country ai  and thus a 
qualified majority prefer a move to the right. The set P(  q i) of policies that the 
Parliament approves in the fifth stage is then the set of policies the Parliament 
prefers  to  the  status  quo.  It contains  all  policies  that  are  closer  to  the 
Parliament's ideal policy than is  the status quo. Similarly, the set Q(qi)  of 
policies that a qualified majority in the Council approves in the fourth stage is 
the set of policies country ai  prefers to the status quo. 
----- Figure 3 about here-----
A  proposal that belongs to the sets  p(qi)  and  Q(qi)  does not necessarily 
reach the last two stages of the old codecision procedure, however. In the 
second stage the  Parliament can propose  a  joint text,  and  this  joint text 
becomes ED policy if a qualified majority approves it in the third stage. Since 
the countries think ahead, they compare the joint text to the proposal in the 
third stage. The joint text is then adopted if a qualified majority prefers it to 
the proposal. 
The Parliament can thus successfully propose a joint text in the second stage if 
there are policies a qualified majority prefers to the proposal. The Parliament 
uses this opportunity if it prefers such policies to the proposal. As a result, the 
proposal does not reach the last two stages of the procedure if there are 
policies the Parliament and a qualified majority prefer to it. 
Proposition 1 presents the conclusions of the unidimensional model of the old 
codecision procedure. 
Proposition  1  Under  the  old  codecision  procedure  the  set  CD;ld  of successful 
proposals on dimension i is  the set of  policies  that satisfy the following requirements: 
(1)  they are preferred to the status quo by the Parliament and a qualified majority, and 
(2)  no  policy  is  preferred  to  them  by  the  Parliament and a qualified  majority.  The 
9 Commission successfully proposes the policy  Pold i  that belongs to the set  CD~1d and is 
closest to its ideal policy. 
In Figure 3 the Parliament successfully proposes a joint text if the proposal is 
to the left of its ideal policy. The Parliament, country ai  and thus a qualified 
majority then prefer a policy to the right of the proposal. If the proposal is to 
the  right  of  country  bi IS  ideal  policy,  the  Parliament  also  successfully 
proposes a joint text. The Parliament, country bi  and thus a qualified majority 
then prefer a policy to the left of the proposal. If the proposal is between the 
ideal  policies  of  the  Parliament  and  country  ai,  the  Parliament  cannot 
successfully propose a joint text. The Parliament prefers policies to the left of 
the proposal, whereas a qualified majority in the Council prefers policies to 
the right. If the proposal is between the ideal policies of countries ai  and bi , 
the  Parliament  cannot  successfully  propose  a  joint  text  either,  since  the 
Council cannot agree on a policy change by a qualified majority. In Figure 3 
the set CD~'d of successful policies is thus the set of policies between the ideal 
policies  of  the  Parliament and  country  bi •  The  Commission  successfully 
proposes country bls ideal policy, i.e., Po'/ =  p/ . 
3.2 The Multidimensional Model of Old Codecision 
In  the  multidimensional  model  of  the  old  codecision  procedure  the 
Commission and the Parliament are not considered as  unitary actors.  The 
Commission  President  makes  the  proposal  and  presents  it to  his  fellow 
Commissioners. The Parliament President then proposes a joint text and he 
10 presents it to the Council President. In other aspects the multidimensional 
model is similar to the unidimensional model. 
In  the  seventh  and  eighth  stages  the  countries  and  MEPs  vote  on  the 
Commission proposal.  They compare it to  the status quo.  The set P(q)  of 
policies  the Parliament approves in the eighth stage of the old codecision 
procedure, as shown in Figure I, is  the set of policies a  majority of MEPs 
prefer to the status quo. Similarly, the set Q(q) of policies a qualified majority 
in the Council approves in the seventh stage, is the set of policies a qualified 
majority prefers to the status quo. 
Figure 4 shows the sets P(q)  and Q(q) for a particular configuration of ideal 
policies in a two-dimensional policy space. In Figure 4 the two policies that 
the  EU  is  addressing  during  the  Commission's  term  are  (1)  market 
liberalization (economic  policy)  and (2)  cohesion (social  policy).  The ideal 
policies of the countries and MEPs were chosen for illustrative purposes but 
correspond to reality. The "southern" countries (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy 
and Portugal) want to move far on cohesion, but want little change on market 
liberalization.  They  have  a  total  of  31  votes  in the  Council.  The  United 
Kingdom, with 10 votes, wants a lot more liberalization, but little change on 
cohesion. The "core" countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands  and  Austria),  as  well  as  the  "northern"  countries  (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden) have intermediate positions on both issues. They have 
36 and 10 votes respectively. 
---Figure 4 about here---
Figure 4 also presents the ideal policies of the two principal political groups in 
the Parliament. These groups are the group of the Party of European Socialists 
(PES)  and the conservative European People's Party (EPP).l1  In Figure 4  I 
consider these two groups as unitary actors, as they tend to be cohesive. In 
11 practice,  for  a  policy  to  receive  the  support of a  majority  of  MEPs,  the 
approval of the tv'lO main political groups in the Parliament is needed. The set 
P(q) is thus the set of policies that are preferred to the status quo by the PES 
and EPP groups. It is bounded by the dotted parts of the indifference curves 
of these groups through the status quo. 
In the Council the core countries as well as the southern countries represent a 
blocking minority in Figure 4, i.e., without them no qualified majority can be 
formed. Together the core and southern countries form a qualified majority. 
The set Q(q) is thus the set of policies that are preferred to the status quo by 
the core and southern countries. It is  bounded by the dashed parts of the 
indifference curves of these countries through the status quo. As a result the 
set P(  q) (l  Q(  q) of policies that are preferred to the status quo by a majority of 
MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council is the set of policies that are 
preferred to the status quo by the PES and EPP groups, the southern countries 
and the core  countries.  It is  bounded by the indifference  curves  of  these 
groups and countries through the status quo. 
A proposal that belongs to the set P(q) (l  Q(q) does not necessarily reach the 
last two stages of the old codecision procedure, however. In the third stage 
the Parliament President can propose a joint text, and this joint text becomes 
ED  policy  if  the  Council  President,  a  majority  of  MEPs  and  a  qualified 
majority approve it. Since the Council President, the MEPs and the countries 
think ahead, they compare the joint text to the proposal. The joint text is then 
adopted if the Council President, a majority of MEPs and a qualified majority 
prefer it to the proposal. 
The Parliament President can thus successfully propose a  joint text in the 
third stage if there are policies the Council President, a majority of MEPs and 
a qualified majority prefer to the proposal. The Parliament President uses this 
opportunity  if  he  prefers  such policies  to  the  proposal.  As  a  result,  the 
12 proposal does not reach the last two stages of the procedure if there are 
policies the Parliament and Council Presidents, a  majority of :MEPs  and a 
qualified majority in the Council prefer to it. 
Suppose that in Figure 4 the Parliament President belongs to the EPP group 
and that a core country is Council President. The set IT(q) of proposals that get 
through  the  last  six  stages  of  the  old  codecision  procedure  is  then  the 
trapezoid formed by the ideal policies of the PES and EPP groups and the core 
and southern countries. Suppose the Commission proposal belongs to the set 
IT(q).  The Parliament President then does not propose a joint text, because 
there is no policy the Council President, the southern and core countries and 
the PES and EPP groups prefer to the proposal. The proposal is approved by a 
majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council, and becomes ED 
policy. 
In the second  stage  the  Commissioners vote on the  proposal.  Suppose a 
majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council prefer it to the status 
quo.  Suppose furthermore  that there  are  no  policies  the  Parliament and 
Council Presidents, a majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council 
prefer to the proposal. If the Commissioners reject the proposal, a status quo 
proposal is sent to the Council and the Parliament. The Parliament President 
then successfully proposes the policy jt(q) he prefers most among the policies 
that are preferred to the status quo by the Council President, a majority of 
MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council. The proposal thus moves on to 
the third stage if a majority of the Commissioners prefer it to the policy jt(q). 
In Figure 4 the policy jt(q) is equal to the EPP's ideal policy. If  the Commission 
proposes the status quo, the Parliament President can successfully propose 
any joint text that belongs to the set P(q) n Q(q). In particular, he successfully 
proposes his own ideal policy. 
13 Proposition 2 presents the conclusions of the multidimensional model of the 
old codecision procedure. 
Proposition  2  The  set  CDOId  of successful  proposals  under  the  old  codecision 
procedure  is  the  set of policies  that satisfy the follo'wing  requirements:  (1)  they  are 
preferred  to  the  status  quo  by a majority of MEPs  and a qualified majority in  the 
Council,  (2)  no policy is preferred to them by the Parliament and Council Presidents, 
a majority of  MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council, and (3) a majority of  the 
Commissioners  prefer them  to  the policy jt(q)  the  Parliament President prefers most 
among  the  policies  that are  preferred  to  the  status quo  by  the  Council  President,  a 
majority  of MEPs  and  a qualified  majority  in  the  Council.  In  the  first  stage  the 
Commission  President successfully proposes  the  policy  Paid  that  belongs  to  the  set 
CDoid  and is closest to his ideal policy. 
The first requirement ensures that the proposal receive final approval in the 
Council and the Parliament. The second requirement makes sure that the 
proposal not be amended by the Council and the Parliament, whereas the 
third  requirement  states  that the  proposal  needs  to  receive  Commission 
approval. 
Suppose that in Figure 4  all  countries  appoint Commissioners with ideal 
policies equal to their own, and that the Commission President's ideal policy 
is  equal  to  the  core  countries'  ideal  policy.  There  are  then  seven 
Commissioners  with ideal  policies  equal  to  the  southern countries'  ideal 
policy. Eight Commissioners have ideal policies equal to the core countries', 
three Commissioners are at the northern countries' ideal policy, and two at 
the  UK's.  The  set  CDoid  of successful  proposals under the old codecision 
procedure is then the shaded area. It is a subset of the set IT(q). The policies in 
the northwestern part of the set IT(q) are not preferred to the policy jt(q) by a 
majority  of  the  Commissioners:  only  the  Commissioners  of  the  southern 
countries  prefer  them.  The  policies  in the set IT(q)  southeast of the UK's 
14 indifference curve through the policy jt(q), are preferred to that policy by a 
majorit"y  of  the  Commissioners  and  thus  constitute  the  set  CDold •  The 
Commission President then successfully proposes his own ideal policy as EU 
policy  P  old.  The Commissioners of the core and northern countries and the 
UK  approve  it,  because  they  prefer  it to  the  policy jt(q).  The  Parliament 
President does not propose a joint text, because there is no policy the Council 
President prefers to the proposal. All countries, the PES and EPP groups, and 
thus a majority of MEPs, approve it because they prefer the proposal to the 
status quo. 
3.3 Discussion of the Old Codecision Procedure 
In  this  subsection  I  discuss  the  countries',  Commissioners',  MEPs'  and 
institutions'  powers and the extent of indecision under the old codecision 
procedure. An institution's power, given a configuration of ideal policies and 
status quo, is defined as its ability to obtain a policy that is close to its ideal 
policy.  It is  measured  by  the  distance  between  its  ideal  policy  and  the 
equilibrium  policy,  a  smaller  distance  indicating more power.  Countries', 
Commissioners' and MEPs' powers are measured analogously. Indecision is 
defined as the EU's inability to act to alter the status quo. It is measured by 
the set of status quos that cannot be changed through equilibrium play of the 
procedure. 
The Commission, in particular its President, has considerable agenda setting 
powers under the old codecision procedure. The Commission President can 
choose any policy that satisfies the requirements summed up in Proposition 2. 
The Parliament becomes a genuine colegislator equal in stature to the Council. 
Both  institutions  need  to  approve  Commission  proposals,  and  they  can 
together  amend  them  In  the  Conciliation  Committee.  The  Council  can 
unanimously amend a Commission proposal before it reaches the Parliament, 
15 but it is unlikely that all countries prefer another policy in the set CDoid  to the 
policy  Pold' The use of absolute majority rule in the Parliament, rather than 
simple  majority  rule,  does  not  create  a  relative  disadvantage  for  the 
Parliament either, as the Council also uses a super majority rule. 
The EU is unable to act in four instances: (1)  if no qualified majority in the 
Council agrees on a new policy, (2)  if no majority of MEPs agrees, (3)  if a 
majority of MEPs does not agree with a qualified majority in the Council, and 
(4) if neither a majority of the Commissioners nor the Council and Parliament 
Presidents agree with a  majority of MEPs  and a  qualified majority in the 
Council. 
4 The New Codecision Procedure 
4.1 The Unidimensional Model of New Codecision 
The new codecision procedure looks like the old procedure without the last 
two stages, as shown in Figure 2.  The countries and the Parliament cannot 
return to the Commission proposal if they fail to agree on a joint text. As a 
result the countries compare the joint text to the status quo rather than to the 
Commission proposal in the third stage of the procedure. The joint text is 
adopted if a qualified majority prefers it to the status quo. 
The Parliament can thus successfully propose a joint text in the second stage if 
there  are  policies  a  qualified  majority  prefers  to  the  status  quo.  The 
Parliament uses this opportunity if it prefers such policies to the status quo. In 
particular,  it proposes the  policy  it prefers  most among the  policies  that 
belong to the set Q(qi)  of policies that are preferred to the status quo by a 
qualified  majority. This  policy  is  approved by a  qualified majority in the 
Council  and  becomes  EU  policy.  The  Commission  proposal  is  irrelevant 
16 under the new codecision procedure, as it is no longer the reversion policy if 
no joint text is approved. In Figure 3 the Parliament proposes its own ideal 
policy as a joint text. This policy is adopted, as a qualified majority prefers it 
to the status quo. 
In reality the Parliament does not necessaily get t~e chance to propose the 
joint text. Countries could also get the opportunity to propose the joint text. 
Moreover, the Parliament and the countries can propose amendments to the 
joint text.  In equilibrium the proposer of the joint text,  whether it be the 
Parliament or a country, thus proposes the policy it prefers most among the 
policies that satisfy the following two requirements: (1)  they are preferred to 
the status quo by the Parliament and a qualified majority in the Council, and 
(2) no policy is preferred to them by the Parliament and a qualified majority 
in the Council. 
Proposition 3 presents the conclusions of the unidimensional model of the 
new codecision procedure. 
Proposition 3 Under  the new codecision procedure the set  CD:'ewof successful joint 
texts  on  dimension  i  consists  of the  policies  that  satisfy  the  following  two 
requirements:  (1)  they  are  preferred  to  the  status  quo  by  the  Parliament  and  a 
qualified  majority  in  the  Council,  and  (2)  no  policy  is  preferred  to  them  by  the 
Parliament  and  a qualified  majority  in  the  Council.  It  is  equal  to  the  set  CD!ld of 
successful proposals under the old codecision procedure. The proposer of  the joint text, 
whether it be  the  Parliament or a country, successfully proposes  the policy it prefers 
most among the  policies  that belong  to  the set  CD:'ew.  The  Commission  is irrelevant 
under the new codecision procedure. 
4.2 The Multidimensional Model of New Codecision 
17 The  multidimensional model of  the new codecision  procedure is  like  the 
multidimensional model of the old codecision procedure without the last two 
stages, as shown in Figure 1.  As in the unidimensional model no policy is 
adopted if the Council and the Parliament fail to agree on a joint text. 
In the fifth and sixth stages the countries and MEPs vote on the joint text. 
They compare it to the status quo. The set P(q)  of joint texts the Parliament 
approves in the fifth stage, is the set of policies a majority of MEPs prefer to 
the status quo. Similarly, the set Q(q) of joint texts a qualified majority in the 
Council approves in the sixth stage, is the set of policies a qualified majority 
prefers to the status quo. Figure 4 shows the sets P(q) and Q(q) for a particular 
configuration of ideal policies, as mentioned above. 
In the fourth stage the Council President approves the joint text, if he prefers 
it to the status quo. The Parliament President can thus successfully propose a 
joint text in the third stage  if  there  are  policies  the Council  President,  a 
majority  of  MEPs  and a  qualified  majority  prefer  to  the  status quo.  The 
Parliament President uses this opportunity if he prefers such policies to the 
status quo. In particular he proposes as a joint text the policy he prefers most 
among the policies the Council President, a majority of MEPs and a qualified 
majority prefer to the status quo. This joint text is approved by the Council 
President, a majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council. As a 
result, it becomes EU policy. As in the unidimensional model the Commission 
proposal is irrelevant, because the countries and MEPs cannot turn back to it 
if  they fail  to  agree  to  a  joint  text.  In Figure 4  the  Parliament President 
successfully proposes his ideal policy, which is equal to the EPP's ideal policy. 
In reality  the  Parliament President does  not necessaily  get the chance  to 
propose the joint text. The Council President could also get the opportunity to 
propose the joint text. Moreover, the Parliament and Council Presidents can 
propose amendments to the joint text. In equilibrium the proposer of the joint 
18 text, whether he be the Parliament or Council President, thus proposes the 
policy  he prefers  most among the  policies  that satisfy  the following  rNO 
requirements: (1)  they are preferred to the status quo by the Parliament and 
Council  Presidents,  a  majority  of  MEPs  and  a  qualified  majority  in  the 
Council, and (2) no policy is preferred to them by the Parliament and Council 
Presidents, a majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council. 
Proposition 4 presents the conclusions of the multidimensional model of the 
new codecision procedure. 
Proposition 4  The  set  CDnew  of successful  joint  texts  under  the  new  codecision 
procedure consists of  the policies that satisfy the following two requirements: (1) they 
are preferred to  the status quo by the  Council and Parliament Presidents, a majority 
of MEPs and a qualified  majority in  the  Council,  and  (2)  no  policy is  preferred  to 
them by the  Council and Parliament Presidents, a majority of  MEPs and a qualified 
majority in the  Council.  The  proposer of  the joint text, whether he be the  Parliament 
or  Council  President,  successfully  proposes  the  policy  he  prefers  most  among  the 
policies  that belong  to  the  set  CDnew. The  Commission  is  irrelevant under the  new 
codecision procedure. 
In Figure 4 the set CDnew  is the trapezoid formed by the ideal policies of the 
southern and core countries and the PES and EPP. It is a superset of the set 
CDo1d • 
4.3 Discussion of the New Codecision Procedure 
The Commission loses its agenda setting powers under the new codecision 
procedure. It becomes completely irrelevant.  Under the old procedure the 
Commission President could choose a policy that would be approved by a 
majority  of  his  fellow  Commissioners,  would  not  be  amended  in  the 
Conciliation Committee and would receive final approval in the Parliament 
19 and the Council. The Commission President cannot choose EU policy under 
the  new procedure, because  pjs  proposal no longer  provides  a  reversion 
policy in case the Conciliation Committee fails to agree to a joint text. If no 
joint text is approved, the status quo prevails. The Commission proposal is 
thus irrelevant during the negotiations in the Conciliation Committee. 
Under the new procedure the Council and Parliament Presidents have agenda 
setting powers, rather than the Commission. The proposer of a joint text can 
successfully propose any policy that satisfies the two requirements mentioned 
in Proposition 4. The first requirement ensures that the joint text receive final 
approval in the Parliament and the Council. The second requirement makes 
sure that the joint text not be amended by the Council and the Parliament. 
Whether the procedural changes do indeed lead to an increase in the MEPs' 
and countries' powers depends on the configuration of ideal policies and their 
bargaining powers within the Conciliation Committee. Countries and MEPs 
gain power if the proposer of the joint text chooses a policy that is closer to 
their ideal policies, than is the policy the Commission President would choose 
under the old procedure. Similarly, MEPs and countries gain power if they 
have much bargaining power in the Conciliation Committee. The MEPs thus 
lose power if the Council President proposes the joint text under the new 
procedure and has an ideal policy that is further from their ideal policies than 
are the Commissioners' ideal policies. 
There is more indecision under the new than under the old procedure. The 
EU is unable to act in four instances: (1) if no qualified majority in the Council 
agrees on a new policy, (2)  if no majority of MEPs agrees, (3)  if a majority of 
MEPs does not agree with a qualified majority in the Council, and (4)  if the 
Council and Parliament Presidents do not agree with a majority of MEPs and 
a  qualified majority in the Council.  The fourth requirement is  stricter than 
under the old procedure, because the Council and Parilament Presidents have 
20 to  agree  to  a  change  even  if  a  majority  of  the  Commissioners  agrees. 
Moreover, indecision increases if the bargaining process in the Conciliation 
Committee is  not well specified.  The status quo prevails if  the Committee 
does not reach agreement. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper presents spatial theories of the codecision procedure in the ED. It 
analyzes  the  old  codecision  procedure,  as  introduced  by  the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht, and the new version of that procedure, as proposed in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The paper studies unidimensional as well as multidimensional 
models  of  the  old  and  new  procedures.  It characterizes  equilibrium  ED 
policies,  sets  of  successful  proposals;  i.e.  policies  the  Commission  can 
successfully  propose,  and  sets  of  successful  joint  texts,  i.e.  policies  the 
Parliament and Council Presidents can successfully propose, as functions of 
the countries', MEPs' and Commissioners' ideal policies and the location of 
the status quo. 
Under the old codecision procedure a  policy is  successful if  (1)  a  qualified 
majority in the Council and a majority of MEPs prefer it to the status quo, (2) 
no  policy  is  preferred  to  it by the  Parliament and Council  Presidents,  a 
majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council, and (3) a majority of 
the Commissioners prefer it to the policy that would be implemented if the 
Commmission  proposed  the  status  quo.  The  Commission  President 
successfully  proposes the policies  he prefers most among the policies that 
satisfy these requirements. 
Under the new co  decision procedure the Commission proposal is irrelevant. 
A joint text becomes EU policy if (1) the Parliament and Council Presidents, a 
qualified majority in the Council and a majority of MEPs prefer it to the status 
quo, (2) no policy is preferred to it by the Parliament and Council Presidents, 
21 a majority of MEPs and a qualified majority in the Council. The equilibrium 
EU  policy  is  not  chosen  by  the  COffiIlLission  President,  but  rather  it  is 
determined by the Parliament and Council Presidents and depends on their 
respective bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. 
The changes to the codecision procedure agreed to in Amsterdam reduce the 
Commission's powers. In fact, the Commission becomes irrelevant under the 
new codecision procedure. Whether countries' and MEPs'  powers increase 
depends on the bargaining within the Conciliation Committee and on their 
ideal  policies.  Countries  and  MEPs  with  little  bargaining  powers  and 
preferences similar to the Commissioners' lose powers. The other countries 
and MEPs gain power. 
Rather  than  strengthening  the  Parliament's  powers  and  reducing  the 
Council's  powers,  as  the  changes  intended,  they  have  thus  reduced  the 
Commission's  powers.  Moreover,  they  decrease  the  Parliament's  powers, 
insofar as the Parliament can be considered as having preferences similar to 
the Commission's, as is often supposed, and as having little bargaining power 
compared to the Council. Indecision increases under the new procedure. 
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1 The codecision procedure is one of the three principal legislative procedures in the EU. The 
other two procedures are the consultation and cooperation procedures. The codecision 
procedure accounts for about 15 percent of EU legislation (34 first readings in 1997). The 
consultation procedure accounts for about two thirds (154 opinions in 1997), and the 
cooperation procedure for about 10 percent (19 first readings in 1997). 
2 The Council, the Parliament and the Commission are the three principal institutions 
involved in the EU legislative process. The Council is an intergovernmental body. It consists 
of representatives of the member countries' national governments. It is the main legislative 
institution in the EU. The Parliament is directly elected. It co-legislates with the Council under 
some of the EU's legislative procedures. The Commission is the EU's executive. It is appointed 
by the Council and the Parliament. It proposes and implements EU legislation. Currently, the 
Council has 15 members, the Parliament 626, and the Commission 20. The five largest 
countries (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) have two Commissioners 
each, the other countries have one each. See Nugent (1994) for a more detailed description of 
the EU institutions. 
3 The unidimensional model of the old codecision procedure and its conclusions were 
presented earlier by Crombez (1997a). 
4 When I mention an institution's power in a multidimensional context, I am referring to the 
power of the institution's President. 
S  I assume that the Commission President makes a  proposal within the Commission. This 
seems reasonable given the Commission President's prominent role in the Commission. 
6 A joint text is worked out in the Conciliation Committee and then voted on in the Council 
and the Parliament. The Conciliation Committee consists of the members of the Council and 
an equal number of representatives of the Parliament. The Council and Parliament Presidents 
(or their representatives) take turns at chairing the Committee's meetings. Both Presidents 
also convene prior to the Committee's meetings to agree on a compromise. Therefore, it seems 
24 reasonable to assume that the Presidents present a joint text they agree on to the Council and 
the Parliament. In the model I assume that the Parliament President proposes the joint text. 
This assumption does not affect the conclusions. See Corbett et al. (1995) on the functioning of 
the Conciliation Committee. 
7 The Parliament uses absolute majority rule. As I disregard abstentions, absolute majority 
rule is equivalent to simple majority rule. Therefore, I omit the adjective"  absolute" 
throughout this paper. 
S  France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have 10 votes each; Spain 8;  Belgium, 
Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands 5 each; Austria and Sweden 4 each; Denmark, Finland 
and Ireland 3 each; and Luxembourg 2. 
9 In other words Black's median voter theorem applies (Black 1958). 
10 As seen above, the ideal policy of the median Commissioner (MEP) on dimension i can be 
thought of as the Commission's (Parliament's) ideal policy on dimension i. 
11 Currently the PES group consists of 214 members, whereas the EPP group has 200 members 
in the 626 member Parliament. 
25 Figure 1  :The Codecision Procedure: Multiple Dimensions. 
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Figure 2: The Codecision Procedure: One Dimension. 
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